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Abstract 
Ever since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system, gold has retained its function as an 
important monetary commodity (Baur and Lucey, 2010), and continues to provide important 
inflation forecasting information to monetary policy setters (Tkacz, 2007). However, Capie et 
al. (2005) highlight the instability of gold price dynamics through time, attributing it to 
unpredictable political attitudes and events. In this paper, we investigate gold price dynamics 
under different inflation regimes and stock market conditions using UK and US index-linked 
Treasury bond data. We show that gold lost its role as an inflation hedge after May 1997 in the 
UK, and after 2003 did not act as an inflation hedge in the US, supporting the argument that 
gold is an inflation hedge only in periods of high inflation and inflation expectations. Further, 
we show that gold retained its safe haven status throughout the sample period in both countries, 
but it did not act as a stock market hedge in the UK except during the 2008-9 global financial 
crisis. Finally, we conduct an event-study analysis of the impact of QE announcements from 
four leading central banks on the gold price in US dollars. While the QE announcements of the 
US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank exerted a strong and weak influence on 
gold, respectively, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan’s QE announcements had no 
discernible impact on the gold price.   
Keywords:  Gold price; Hedging; Central banks; Bank of England independence; 
Quantitative Easing 
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The impact of monetary policy on gold price dynamics 
 
1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2007-8 presented many investors with a strong motivation to 
search for ‘safe haven’ assets. Since the beginning of 2016, the gold price has risen by more 
than 30%, placing it as one of the best performing assets for investors during that period. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the gold price and the general price level move together, 
and as a result for millennia and across cultures gold represented an effective store of value. 
Even in the post-Bretton-Woods system era, gold remains an effective investment tool in many 
countries in the form of coin, bullion, certificates or warrants (Worthington and Pahlavani, 
2007). Perusal of the academic literature on gold indicates that of the key economic drivers of 
the demand for gold, the rate of inflation is the most heavily researched. Fisher (1930) 
establishes the fundamental positive relationship between expected asset returns and expected 
inflation. There is an extensive empirical literature on the relationship between gold prices and 
inflation, commencing with Jastram (1978), and later extended by Jastram and Leyland (2009), 
who examines the long run relationship between the price of gold and inflation in England over 
the period 1560-2007 and in the US over the period 1808-2007. They find that gold maintained 
its purchasing power over long periods of time, for example, over 50-year intervals, but was a 
poor hedge against major inflation because the purchasing power of gold mirrored that of the 
general price level under the Gold Standard where the nominal price of gold was held constant. 
More recent studies confirm that gold can serve as a profitable investment opportunity under 
extreme market conditions (see Baur and McDermott, 2010; Narayan et al., 2013; and Narayan 
et al., 2015). 
In this paper we examine the usefulness of gold as a hedge against inflation, currency 
depreciation and stock market fluctuation in a UK setting over the period 1985-2015 and in a 
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US setting over the period 2003-2015. Furthermore we investigate the impact of Quantitative 
Easing (QE) announcements made by the central banks of four major economies on gold prices. 
Our paper makes three important contributions. First, we test our hypotheses using market-
implied inflation expectations data. Consistent with the recent literature, the data we employ 
includes the break-even inflation rate (BEIR), also referred to as inflation compensation, which 
is the sum of inflation expectations, the inflation risk premium and the liquidity premium. Liu 
et al. (2015) argue that the BEIR is increasingly used in central bank publications, market 
commentaries and empirical research as it provides the timeliest indicator of inflation 
expectations (Joyce et al., 2010; Abrahams et al., 2013; and Pflueger and Viceira, 2013). BEIR 
may be estimated in real time every trading day without any lag, unlike conventional measures 
of inflation expectations extracted from economic surveys or forecasted using econometric 
models, which are available only on a monthly or bi-annual basis. Second, our empirical 
models take account of the structural shift in the level of UK inflation and inflation 
expectations. More specifically, on 6th May 1997, the UK Government handed to the Bank of 
England responsibility for the setting of interest rates to meet its stated inflation target. This 
marked the beginning of the Bank’s operational independence and its full commitment to 
inflation targeting. We use this event as a cut-off point for the UK sample data as the level of 
inflation and inflation expectations are high in the subperiod before this event, and low in the 
subperiod thereafter. We argue that the changes in the level of inflation and inflation 
expectations impact upon the role of gold as an inflation hedge. More precisely, the fall in 
inflation and inflation expectations should stop the gold price reacting to inflation expectations. 
When inflation and inflation expectations are at a low level, investors may in this event view 
gold as an asset with limited potential in terms of capital gains. Once investors take into account 
the transaction costs associated with buying and selling gold, they may decide that trading in 
gold is not worthwhile, and will stop treating gold as an inflation hedge. We build on the work 
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of Laurent (1994) who argues that the gold price only reacts to changes in ‘deep-seated’ 
inflation expectations. If investors no longer fear deep-seated inflation then gold should lose 
its property as an inflation hedge. Third, we conduct an event study examining the impact of 
QE-related news announcements on the price of gold. In response to the deterioration of 
financial markets during the period 2008 to 2009, the central banks of the major economies 
embarked upon the unconventional monetary policy of Quantitative Easing (QE). A former 
Chief Economist of the Bank of England, Spencer Dale, identified the central objective 
underlying QE as the injection of a substantial amount of money into the economy via the 
portfolio rebalancing channel (Dale, 2010). To the extent that investors do not view money as 
a perfect substitute for gilts, they will reduce the additional holding of money by switching into 
other sterling assets or foreign assets, thereby pushing up their prices. There is a large body of 
literature examining the effect of QE on asset prices (D’Amico and King, 2010; Gagnon et al., 
2011; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson, 2011; Neely, 2011; Joyce et al., 2011; Ugai 
2007; and Wright, 2012). Despite differences in the methods and sample periods employed, 
the majority of existing studies agree that QE had a significant impact on Treasury yields, 
though evidence of its effect on other assets such as corporate bonds and equities is mixed. By 
means of an event study approach, Gagnon et al. (2011) find that the QE1 round of the US 
Federal Reserve had a significant and negative impact on the yield of higher-grade corporate 
bonds and mortgage backed securities (MBS). Using a VAR analysis, Wright (2011) shows 
that the monetary policy shock lowered higher-grade corporate bond yields and raised stock 
prices, with the effects wearing off after a few months. However, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011) demonstrate that the impact of QE1 and QE2 had a smaller effect on lower-
grade corporate bonds, and the impact of QE on MBS was only marked in QE1 where QE 
involved MBS purchases. Using both event studies and a VAR analysis, Joyce et al. (2011) 
find that the Bank of England’s QE operation reduced corporate bond yields markedly, and its 
6 
 
impact on equities was potentially large but highly uncertain as the announcement of QE may 
give investors information concerning the outlook of the economy and corporate earnings. If 
the outlook is worse than expected then it should lower their expectations for dividend 
payments, resulting in lower equity prices. To date, no paper has focused attention on the 
impact of QE on the gold price. As a store of value, gold provides an alternative to financial 
assets such as money and gilts. Even if a small proportion of gilts previously held by investors 
is replaced with gold as a result of QE, the increase in demand should push the gold price higher 
simply as a result of the portfolio rebalancing channel. Therefore, we argue that the 
announcement of the commencement or an expansion of QE should give rise to a positive 
impact on the gold price, and an indication of the end or the reduction of QE should produce a 
negative impact.  
Our key results may be summarised as follows. First, gold provided an effective hedge against 
inflation over the subperiod of 1985-1997 in the UK when inflation and inflation expectations 
were high. But it proved not to provide an inflation hedge in the UK over the subperiod of 
1997-2015 or in the US over the period of 2003-2015 when inflation and inflation expectations 
were low. Second, gold acted as a stock market hedge in the US over the period of 2003-2015, 
but did not provide such a hedge in the UK over either the same period or over the whole 
sample period of 1985-2015. However, gold acted as a stock market hedge during the global 
financial crisis in both countries, and provided a safe haven in all periods examined for both 
countries. Third, our results show that gold has provided an effective currency hedge for 
investors over both the whole study period and the sub-sample periods in the UK, and over the 
whole study period in the US. Finally, using an event-study analysis we find evidence of a 
significant impact of US Federal Reserve QE announcements on the gold price, while the 
influence of the European Central Bank QE announcements is much weaker. The gold price 
did not respond at all to QE news announcements from either the Bank of England or the Bank 
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of Japan. The rest of our paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we review the academic 
literature on gold as a hedging tool. In section 3 we discuss the data employed in our study, 
followed by the econometric model which we discuss in section 4. In section 5, we present and 
discuss the empirical evidence arising from our models. Section 6 provides a summary and 
conclusion. 
 
2. The gold price and its determinants 
Generally speaking, there are two main reasons for people to hold gold: (i) for the purposes of 
consumption e.g. for jewellery; (ii) for the purposes of investment or preserving wealth, 
whereby gold is used to hedge against inflation, exchange rate and stock market fluctuations. 
Laurent (1994) argues that the stable purchasing power of gold was instrumental to the 
automatic price stabilisation mechanism of the Gold Standard (see also Mill, 1987 and Barro, 
1979). Under the Gold Standard, a rise of the price level of goods relative to that of gold meant 
a fall in the purchasing power of gold. This reduced the incentive to produce gold and diverted 
some of the existing gold stock from monetary to consumption uses such as jewellery, thereby 
causing the money supply to fall. The fall in the money supply caused the price level of goods 
to fall until the relative price of gold rose to its long-term level. Conversely, a fall in the general 
price level relative to gold encouraged gold producers to find and extract new gold at a greater 
cost, causing the money supply and the price level of goods to rise. 
However, under a system of fiat money, there is no longer a built-in stabilisation mechanism, 
and thus gold becomes a commodity like any other. Garner (1995) argues that whether the price 
of gold relative to the general price level remains stable depends on different forces. A rise in 
inflation expectations may cause investors to shift their funds from financial assets, such as 
money and bonds, to gold. As the supply of gold is more or less fixed in the short run, even a 
small rise in demand should cause the gold price to rise markedly. Conversely, the general 
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price level rises gradually because the price of many goods and services adjusts only slowly. 
As a result, the rise in the gold price might precede a rise in general prices provided that 
inflation expectations are correct. Thus, the relative price of gold should still be stable in the 
long run, while it should also act as a leading indicator for inflation. 
The empirical evidence in general shows that the nominal price of gold and the general price 
level move together in the long run. Herbst (1983) and Laurent (1994) study the gold price and 
the wholesale price index in the US and find that the two series moved closely over the last two 
centuries and the real price of gold on average remained constant, even though the price of gold 
was pegged for substantial periods and the wholesale price increased dramatically during that 
time. In a study of the aftermath of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, Beckmann and 
Czudaj (2013) find that the price of gold and the general price level are cointegrated in the US, 
the UK, Japan and the Euro area, indicating that a long-term stable linear relationship existed 
in the period from 1970 to 2011. Worthington and Pahlavani (2007) find evidence of 
cointegration for the US after allowing for endogenous structural breaks in the post-war period. 
Using a threshold cointegration technique, Wang et al. (2011) show that the price of gold and 
the general price level are characterised by a linear cointegrated relationship for the US, while 
for Japan there is a threshold cointegrated relationship. 
However, empirical evidence on the relationship between inflation and gold returns in the short 
run is somewhat inconclusive. Chua and Woodward (1982) show that actual, expected and 
unexpected inflation rates are significant explanatory factors for gold returns over the period 
1975 to 1980 for the US, though not for Canada, Germany, Japan, Switzerland and the UK. 
Jaffe (1989) finds for the US that gold returns are significantly related to actual, but not 
expected, inflation over the period 1971 to 1987. Laurent (1994) and Garner (1995) find that 
lagged gold returns can explain the inflation rate, but the predictive power of such returns is 
inferior to the past inflation rate, the general commodity price index, and to variables that 
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measure economic slack such as the unemployment rate and the manufacturing capacity 
utilization rate. Mahdavi and Zhou (1997) employ an out-of-sample forecast method and find 
that gold returns are the worst predictor compared to a general commodity price index and the 
past inflation rate. Cecchetti et al. (2000) use a similar method and find that gold prices can 
improve the forecast accuracy of the rate of inflation. However, they find that an increase in 
gold prices preceding future declines in inflation appears counterintuitive, questioning the use 
of gold as a predictor of inflation. Examining the intraday price of gold futures, Cai et al. (2001) 
and Christie-David et al. (2000) find that the release of monthly inflation data increases the 
volatility of gold futures. However, using daily data, Blose (2010) shows that announcement 
day inflation surprise has no impact on gold returns in the US over the period 1988 to 2008. 
Erb and Harvey (2013) measure unexpected inflation simply by taking the difference between 
the inflation rate in any period and that of the previous period, and find little evidence that gold 
was an effective hedge against unexpected inflation in the US over the period 1975 to 2011. 
However, Tkacz (2007) finds that the return on gold predicts the rate of inflation over a 12-18 
month horizon in most developed countries which have formal inflation targeting over the 
period 1995 to 2004. He argues that in those countries, inflation expectations are more accurate 
and thus gold returns are more likely to predict inflation accurately. 
In relation to the role of gold as a currency hedge, Sjaastad and Scacciavillani (1996) argue 
that an appreciation in a local currency can cause the price of gold in that currency to fall. Capie 
et al. (2005) find evidence for such a negative relationship between the US dollar gold price 
and the value of US dollars against the yen and sterling over the period 1971 to 2004. However, 
they find that the strength of this relationship varies over time and was much weaker before 
1976 and after 1985. Pukthuanthong and Roll (2011) confirm the negative relationship between 
a given currency and the gold price denominated in that currency for the yen, euro and sterling 
using a bivariate GARCH (1,1) model to take account of the conditional heteroskedasticity in 
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the residuals. Using copulas to examine the role of gold as a safe haven or hedge against the 
US dollar, Reboredo (2013) find significant positive average dependence and symmetric tail 
dependence between gold returns in six currencies and US dollar depreciation against these 
currencies over the period 2000 to 2012, indicating that gold can act as a hedge and a safe 
haven against currency movements. Using quantile regressions, Ciner et al. (2013) show that 
over the period from 1990 and 2010, gold acted as a safe haven investment against exchange 
rate movements in both the US and UK. 
It is also widely held that gold can act as a stock and bond market hedge in normal market 
conditions, and a safe haven in ‘abnormal’ times, thereby providing diversification benefits to 
portfolio holders. Hillier et al. (2006) show in a study of the US that gold has a small negative 
beta in normal market conditions and a larger negative beta in volatile market conditions. Baur 
and McDermott (2010) conduct an extensive study for 13 countries over the period 1979 to 
2009, and find that gold provides both a hedge and a safe haven for stock investors in most 
developed countries, while the safe haven effect in emerging countries is weaker. Using 
wavelet analysis, Bredin et al. (2015) find that gold acts as a hedge for a variety of international 
equity and debt markets for horizons of up to one year. Further they find that gold acted as a 
safe haven for equity investors around the 1987 ‘Black Monday’ crash and the global financial 
crisis. However, Agyei-Ampomah et al. (2014) study a sample of sovereign bonds for 13 
countries and show that other precious metals and industrial metals tend to outperform gold as 
either hedging vehicles or safe haven assets against losses in sovereign bonds. 
 
3. Data 
In this paper we model gold price dynamics against data for inflation expectations, exchange 
rates and stock market returns. We measure gold prices using the London PM fixing price in 
pounds sterling and US dollars. For inflation expectations, we use implied inflation 
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expectations calculated by the Bank of England using data from index-linked gilts and 
conventional gilts for the UK, and for the US we use those calculated by the US Treasury using 
Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) and conventional Treasury securities. UK ex-
ante 5-year and 10-year inflation expectations and real interest rates are estimated using a 
spline-based technique (Anderson and Maule, 2014) and the US data are estimated using a 
quasi-cubic hermite spline function (US Department of Treasury, 2009). For exchange rates, 
we collect trade-weighted exchange rate data for both the UK pound sterling and the US dollar, 
and we compute returns on the FTSE 100 index and the S&P 500 index for stock returns for 
the UK and US, respectively. For the event-study analysis, we also collect the 3-month 
Treasury bill rates for the US and the news releases related to Quantitative Easing of the US 
Federal Reserves (FED), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England (BOE) and 
the Bank of Japan (BOJ). All UK data other than the FTSE 100 index, which is taken from 
Datastream, are collected from the Bank of England Statistical Interactive Database. All US 
data other than the S&P 500 index, which is taken from Datastream, are collected from Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED Database. All QE related announcement data are collected 
from two survey papers (Fawley and Neely, 2013; Agostini et al. 2016). Our data consist of 
daily observations covering the period 2nd January 1985 to 19th March 2015 for the UK, and 
the period 2nd January 2003 to 19th March 2015 for the US. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics 
for the model variables. Data for gold prices, exchange rates and the stock index are all 
transformed to natural log differences to avoid spurious regressions associated with non-
stationary variables (Granger and Newbold, 1974). Specifically, our unit root test results 
suggest that the natural logarithms of these variables are non-stationary, but their first-order 
differences are stationary1. 5-year and 10-year inflation expectations are calculated by taking 
the differences between the expectations on any given day and those on the previous day. 
                                                          
1 Augmented Dick Fuller test results are available from the authors upon request.  
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We can observe that the FTSE 100 index produces returns which are on average higher and 
more volatile than gold during the period 1985 to 2015. The average daily return of the FTSE 
100 index is 0.023% which is higher than the average return of gold at 0.014%, and the standard 
deviation of FTSE 100 index daily return is 1.112%, slightly higher than its counterpart for 
gold at 1.032%. However, the S&P 500 index produces lower average returns than gold and 
the two variables have very similar volatility over the period 2003 to 2015. The average daily 
return of the S&P 500 index is 0.028% which is lower than the average return of gold at 0.041%, 
and the standard deviation of the S&P 500 index daily return is 1.249%, similar to its 
counterpart for gold at 1.241%. The pound sterling and the US dollar both depreciate against 
the associated basket of currencies in their respective sample periods by an average of 0.002% 
per day. All of the model daily returns are insignificantly different from zero and the respective 
variable distributions exhibit fat tails, with kurtosis values much greater than the value of 3 for 
normally distributed variables. The kurtosis of the returns on gold, the exchange rate, and the 
FTSE 100 index for the UK are 9.025, 8.154 and 12.704, respectively, and for the US they are 
7.386, 6.966 and 13.725, respectively. On average, the UK’s 10-year inflation expectations fell 
by 0.06 basis points per day over the period. This observation is not surprising as the sample 
commenced in January 1985 when average annual inflation expectations for the following 10 
years was 7.44% and ended in March 2015 when average annual inflation expectations for the 
following 10 years was only 2.69%. On average, the 10-year and 5-year inflation expectations 
for the US did not change over the study period. Consistent with the model returns, the daily 
changes in inflation expectations are insignificantly different from zero. Perhaps as expected, 
the data on US 5-year inflation expectations have a few outliers around the time of the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy which give rise to extreme values for skewness and kurtosis.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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4. Modelling UK and US gold price dynamics 
4.1 Regression analysis  
Our baseline model is described in Equations 1 and 2 below. Equation 1 models the relation 
between gold returns and inflation expectations, the exchange rate and stock market returns. 
Equation 2 is a GARCH model to take account of conditional heteroskedasticity in the data.  
 
𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚(𝑞𝑞),𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 (1) 
ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡)2 + 𝛾𝛾2ℎ𝑡𝑡−1     (2) 
 
Note that 𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑡𝑡 is the return on sterling or dollar gold prices in period t, ∆𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  is the change in 
the p-year UK or US inflation expectation in period t (where p = 5 or 10), 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 is the rate of 
change of the effective exchange rate of pound sterling or the US dollar in period t, 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is the 
return on the FTSE 100 index or the S&P 500 index in period t, and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡  is the error term. 
Following Baur and Lucey (2010), 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚(𝑞𝑞),𝑡𝑡 (q = 1% or 5%) is a multiplicative dummy variable 
equal to the market return when the market return is in the q lower quantile; 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚(𝑞𝑞),𝑡𝑡 is zero in 
all other periods. The error term, 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡, is assumed to follow a GARCH (1,1) process with a time 
varying variance, ℎ𝑡𝑡. The GARCH model is used to control for heteroskedasticity in the data 
which is common in daily financial data.  
We formulate four hypotheses in order to determine whether gold can serve as an inflation 
hedge, exchange rate hedge, stock market hedge, and safe haven asset.  
Hypothesis 1a: 𝛽𝛽1 > 0 (gold is an inflation hedge in periods of high inflation expectations) 
Hypothesis 1b: 𝛽𝛽1 = 0 (gold is not an inflation hedge in periods of low inflation expectations) 
Hypothesis 2: 𝛽𝛽2 < 0 (gold is a currency hedge) 
Hypothesis 3: 𝛽𝛽3 ≤ 0 (gold is a stock market hedge)  
Hypothesis 4: 𝛽𝛽3 + 𝛽𝛽4 ≤ 0 (gold is a safe haven asset) 
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𝛽𝛽1 measures the relation between the gold return and the change in inflation expectations. A 
positive 𝛽𝛽1 implies that a rise in inflation expectations would see the gold price rising, thereby 
producing a positive return. This could be caused by investors treating gold as an inflation 
hedge and diverting their holdings of financial assets to gold when inflation is expected to rise 
in the future. The gold price is believed to rise at the same rate as the general price level in the 
long term. Thus, when inflation is expected to rise so is the gold price. However, investor 
attitude towards gold may be dependent on the level of inflation expectations. If inflation 
expectations are rising from a very low base, investors may feel the gains from switching to 
gold are too small to cover transaction costs. However, when they are expecting higher inflation 
at a time of already high inflation, the perceived gains from switching may be great enough to 
warrant a switch. Our UK data cover a long period which includes some years of high inflation 
(1991:8.40%) and some years of close to zero inflation such as in 2015. Thus our sample 
provides an ideal setting to test our hypotheses 1a and 1b using subsample data corresponding 
to high and low inflation expectations, respectively.  
𝛽𝛽2 measures the relation between the gold return and the rate of change in the trade-weighted 
exchange rate. For an internationally traded commodity such as gold, a change in any exchange 
rate should result in an adjustment in its price denominated in the currency of a country which 
does not have absolute market power in that commodity (Sjaastad and Scacciavillani 1996). 
Despite the dominance of London as a trading centre for gold (Lucey et al. 2013), the UK has 
little market power in the global gold market (Sjaastad and Scacciavillani 1996; Sjaastad 2008). 
Furthermore, although the USD currency block has gained market power in the global gold 
market this century, its market power is far from absolute (Sjaastad 2008). Thus, as the pound 
sterling or the US dollar depreciates, the gold price in the respective currency is expected to 
rise. If Hypothesis 2 is supported, then gold acts as a currency hedge as gold priced in pounds 
sterling or dollars decreases when the pound or dollar appreciates.  
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Baur and Lucey (2010, p. 219) defined a hedge as “an asset that is uncorrelated or negatively 
correlated with another asset or portfolio on average”, and a safe haven asset as “an asset that 
is uncorrelated or negatively correlated with another asset or portfolio in times of market stress 
or turmoil”. The correlation coefficient between the gold return and the FTSE 100 index or the 
S&P 500 index return on average is measured by coefficient 𝛽𝛽3. If Hypothesis 3 is supported, 
then gold acts as a hedge for stock index returns. Finally, the sum of the estimated coefficients 
𝛽𝛽3 and 𝛽𝛽4 measures the coefficient between the gold return and the FTSE 100 index return or 
the S&P 500 index return when the stock market is in stress. In the baseline model, the market 
stress is measured by the 1% lowest quantile dummy. In the alternative parameterization, a 5% 
quantile dummy is used. If no evidence is found to reject Hypothesis 4, then gold acts as a safe 
haven asset.  
4.2 Event-study analysis 
We examine the impact of Quantitative Easing on gold returns using an event study. We follow 
the approach used by Tucker et al. (2013), employing a dummy variable model (see also 
Thompson (1982) and Salinger (1992) for further discussion). The model is simply obtained 
by appending a vector of dummy variables to the conventional Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). Thus, for each news announcement, i, abnormal returns are estimated from the model 
represented by equation (3) below: 
𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�+ ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡27𝜏𝜏=1           (3) 
Note that 𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return on dollar gold prices in period t, around the news announcement, 
i, 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 is the risk-free rate measured by the 3-month US Treasury bill yield in period t, 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 is 
the stock market return measured by the rate of change of S&P 500 index in period t, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 is the 
abnormal return for period 𝜏𝜏,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏,𝑡𝑡 is the dummy variable in period t that takes a value of 1 for 
period 𝜏𝜏 and zero otherwise, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the error term. For each announcement, the estimation 
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period consists of 77 day-observations from 55 days before to 21 days after the announcement. 
The abnormal returns are estimated for 27 days; 5 days pre-event, 1 day event (announcement 
day) plus a further 21 post-event days. For example, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,1,𝑡𝑡 equals 1 five days before the news 
announcement, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,6,𝑡𝑡 equals 1 on the event day, and 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,27,𝑡𝑡 equals 1 on the 21st day of the post-
event period.  
Hypothesis 5 is formulated to examine the impact of QE announcement on the gold price. 
Hypothesis 5a: 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 > 0 (gold price rises when QE is announced to commence or expand) 
Hypothesis 5b: 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 < 0 (gold price falls when QE is announced to stop or shrink) 
Quantitative Easing is one of the unconventional monetary policies widely employed by 
major central banks after the policy rate hits the zero lower bound. One of the main channels 
through which QE may work is the portfolio rebalancing channel. By buying long-term assets 
such as Treasury bonds and MBS from the private sector, central banks expect investors to 
replace them with assets similar in terms of risk and maturity, therefore pushing up the prices 
of long-term assets in general and bringing down the long-term interest rates which are 
crucial to consumer and business borrowing decisions. Gold is a store of value and as such 
provides investors with an alternative investment tool to financial assets such as long-term 
Treasury bonds or MBS. Therefore, we argue that any news indicating the commencement or 
expansion of QE should be positive for the gold price. Further, any news indicating an end to, 
or reduction in, QE should be negative for the gold price. As an international asset, gold is 
demanded by investors across countries, and therefore the gold price may be sensitive to the 
QE news from across the major economies’ central banks. We identify 45 unambiguous QE 
announcements made by the FED (12), ECB (8), BOE (8) and BOJ (17) where central banks 
released news about their asset purchase programmes rather than their liquidity provision 
facilities. The model described in equation (3) is estimated using 77 daily observations 
around each announcement. The results provide evidence on the impact of each 
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announcement on the gold price on the day of announcement, as well as up to five days 
before and up to 21 days after the announcement. If hypothesis 5a or 5b is supported, then 
gold is affected by Quantitative Easing. If the gold market is efficient, then there should be no 
leakage or delayed response (post-event correction) to an announcement, and therefore the 
abnormal returns for all days apart from the announcement.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Inflation hedge 
Figure 1 shows the annual percentage change in the UK Consumer Price Index (CPI) and 10-
year inflation expectations implied by index-linked gilts and conventional gilts data over the 
period 1985 to 2015. Actual and expected inflation are highly correlated and follow a 
downward trend in this period. After reaching a peak of 8.40% in July 1991, the actual inflation 
rate fell sharply throughout the early 1990s, and then remained subdued at around 2% until 
early 2008. In a 2002 speech, the then governor of Bank of England, Mervyn King, observed 
that since inflation targeting was introduced in the UK, inflation has been lower, less volatile 
and less persistent (King, 2002). Importantly, on 6th May 1997, the UK government granted 
operational independence to the Bank of England, making it responsible for monetary policy 
decisions, with the aim of keeping inflation close to the target of 2.5% (reduced to 2% in 2003). 
The fall in the level of both inflation and inflation expectations may be partly attributed to an 
explicit and credible inflation target which helps to anchor the private sector’s views regarding 
long-run inflation risk (Gurkaynak, Levin and Swanson, 2010). However, Lin and Ye (2007) 
argue that inflation targeting has no significant effect on either inflation or inflation variability 
in seven industrial countries. Whether inflation targeting is the cause of, or simply coincides 
with, a period of low and stable inflation in the UK, the moment when it was introduced may 
serve as a cut-off point in our analysis. The subperiod beforehand features high inflation and 
inflation expectations and the data from this subperiod is employed to test hypothesis 1a; gold 
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is an inflation hedge when inflation and inflation expectations are high. The subperiod 
afterwards is characterized by low and stable inflation and inflation expectations, and the data 
from this subperiod is employed to test hypothesis 1b; gold is not an inflation hedge when 
inflation and inflation expectations are low.2 In the relatively short sample period for the US 
(2003-2015), neither inflation nor inflation expectations experienced dramatic changes. Instead 
they were low and stable at around 2% during this period, as observed in Figure 2. As a result, 
the entire sample period for the US is treated as a period of low inflation expectations and is 
employed to test hypothesis 1b alone.  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here] 
The results of our models for the inflation hedge hypotheses are presented in Table 2. Model 
1, which uses UK 10-year inflation expectations, examines the period of high inflation and 
inflation expectations (1985-1997). The coefficient for inflation expectations is positive at 
0.916 and highly significant, indicating that gold acted as an inflation hedge during the 
subsample period. Thus gold prices rise by 0.916% with a 1% increase in 10-year inflation 
expectations. However, this significant positive relationship disappears in the second 
subsample period of 1997-2015, as shown in Model 2. In effect, gold prices stopped reacting 
to changes in inflation expectations, suggesting that gold lost its ability to act as an inflation 
hedge, and providing some support for hypothesis 1b; investors did not buy gold in the presence 
of rising inflation expectations when the level of inflation and inflation expectations were low. 
Model 3, which uses 10-year inflation expectations for the US, examines the period of low 
inflation and inflation expectations. Similar to the UK result for the second subsample, the US 
result gives an insignificant relationship between inflation expectations and gold, providing 
further support for hypothesis 1b. Models 4, 5 and 6, where 5-year inflation expectations are 
                                                          
2 During the implementation of the Bank of England’s quantitative easing programmes, inflation rose sharply to 
around 5% in the second half of 2011. However, as the recovery after the crisis was from a very low base, 
inflation expectations were unlikely to have risen sharply then. 
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employed, provide results which are very similar to those for Models 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
More specifically, a 1 percent movement in 5-year inflation expectations is associated with a 
0.520 percent change in gold prices in the period of high inflation in the UK, 1985-1997, while 
the coefficient estimates for 5-year inflation expectations are insignificantly different from zero 
in the Models 5 and 6, indicating that gold loses its inflation hedge property in the period of 
low inflation and low inflation expectations. Table 2 also shows the diagnostic test results for 
each model. There is no evidence of autocorrelation remaining in either the residuals or squared 
residuals. The R-squared statistic for the US model (Model 3) is the highest at 0.183, followed 
by the UK model in the high inflation period (Model 1) at 0.168, and the UK model in the low 
inflation period (Model 2) at 0.090. All of the control variables, including the rate of change of 
effective exchange rate and the stock market and extreme stock market dummies, are highly 
significant.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
5.2 Currency hedge, stock market hedge and safe haven asset  
Table 3 summarizes the results for the currency hedge, stock market hedge and safe haven 
asset. There is a negative relationship between gold returns and movements in the exchange 
rate for both UK and US. The results in Model 1 shows that a 1 percent appreciation of the 
pound against a basket of currencies is associated with a 0.769 percent fall in gold prices over 
the period 1985 to 2015. In other words, the elasticity of the gold price to the effective sterling 
exchange rate is 0.769 for the whole sample. Model 3 shows that the elasticity of the gold price 
to the effective dollar exchange rate is 1.735 in the shorter and more recent sample period of 
2003 to 2015. Model 2 shows the UK results estimated using the data for an identical period to 
that for the US sample, for the purposes of comparison, and gold price elasticity to the effective 
pound exchange rate is 0.731. All of the exchange rate coefficients are highly significant with 
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z-statistics above 20 in each case. Hence, the evidence presented provides strong support for 
hypothesis 2; gold acts as a currency hedge in both the UK and US.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
The results for the stock market hedge and safe haven vary between the UK and US. When we 
examine both the full sample and the more recent sample for the UK in Models 1 and 2, 
respectively, we find a positive and significant relationship between gold returns and stock 
returns, suggesting that gold does not act as an effective stock market hedge. Instead, the gold 
price in sterling moves in the same direction as the stock market on average. In contrast, Model 
3 shows a negative and significant relationship between the gold price in dollars and the stock 
market, suggesting that gold does indeed act as an effective hedge for the US. These results 
might be explained by a difference in the perspective of UK and US investors. In particular, 
UK investors may be more internationally orientated than their US counterparts in their 
investment decisions. For example, in 2010, UK investors held 50% of their equity portfolio in 
foreign stocks, while only 28% of the equity portfolio of US investors was held in foreign 
stocks (Philips et al., 2012). When domestic stocks are performing badly, UK investors are 
more likely to switch into international stocks instead of gold. In contrast, US investors may 
see their investment options more in terms of stock versus gold. 
The F-test for the hypothesis (𝛽𝛽3 + 𝛽𝛽4) = 0 in Model 1 and Model 3 is significant at the 1% 
level, indicating that gold acted as a safe haven asset for UK investors over the period 1985 to 
2015, and for US investors over the period 2003 to 2015, results which are consistent with the 
findings of Brian and Lucey (2010). In Model 2, the F-test statistic is insignificant, indicating 
that gold acts as a safe haven over the later subperiod of 2003 and 2015 for the UK as well. To 
highlight the influence of the crisis on the stock market hedge and safe haven hypothesis for 
gold, we run the regressions using data for the crisis period in Models 4 and 5. The start date 
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of the global financial crisis is widely considered to be 7th August 2007, when the French bank 
BNP Paribas suspended redemption of shares held in some of its money market funds (Mishkin, 
2011). The end date of crisis is identified as 18th March 2009, when the Fed announced to 
purchase $300 billion in Treasuries, an additional $100 billion in government-sponsored 
enterprise (GSE) debt, and $750 billion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Both the FTSE 
100 index and the S&P 500 index hit bottom after a more than 40% fall on the previous year 
several days before this key policy announcement. Model 5 shows the US results during the 
crisis period are the same as those for the whole US sample; thus gold acted as a stock market 
hedge and safe haven asset for US investors during the crisis. More interestingly, Model 4 
shows that the stock market coefficient is insignificantly different from zero, indicating that 
gold is a stock market hedge for UK investors during the crisis period, thereby highlighting its 
different properties in the wider periods covering both the crisis and normal times. As a 
robustness check, we follow Baur and McDermott (2010) and run Models 1 to 5 from Table 3 
with a dummy variable capturing the least extreme stock market movements corresponding to 
the 5% lowest quantile of the returns distribution. The results of this are shown in table A1 in 
the appendix and are very similar to the equivalent models where the dummy variable picks up 
the most extreme stock market movements. Overall, hypotheses 3 and 4 are strongly supported 
in the US data, and partly supported in the UK data.  
 
5.3 Quantitative Easing and gold price 
The event-study results are presented in four separate tables corresponding to the source of the 
QE announcement. Table 4 reports the event-study results for the QE announcements made by 
the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed). The date and content of announcements are presented in the 
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table along with the estimated abnormal returns of the gold price and the t statistics on the 
announcement day and up to 3 days before and up to 3 days after the announcement3.  
[Insert Table 4] 
There are 12 QE announcements by the Fed, of which eight are followed by significant 
movements of the gold price in the following day. This may be explained by the fact that our 
data for the gold price is collected at 15:00 London GMT when the Fed’s policy decision for 
the day may not have been made. If the news is announced by the Fed at day+0, its impact is 
more likely to be observed at day+1. With one exception, all eight significant announcements 
have the anticipated sign. That is, when the Fed announced a commencement or an expansion 
of QE, the gold price often rose significantly. For example, on 18th March 2009 the Fed 
announced that it would purchase $300 billion in Treasuries, $100 billion in GSE debt and 
$750 billion in MBS. This was followed by a 6.68% rise in the gold price one day later. 
Similarly when the Fed indicated a pause or reduction of QE, gold prices tended to fall 
significantly. For example, on 18th December 2013, the Fed stated that it would begin tapering 
and reduce its bond purchases by $10 billion per month from the following January. This was 
followed by a 2.77% fall in the gold price on the following day. The results for the pre-event 
days are insignificant with one exception, indicating little leakage of QE information. However, 
there are three cases where the post-event days are significant. In particular, both of the 
announcements made in 2014 were followed by two days of significant results with anticipated 
signs, suggesting that the market became slower in digesting QE related news.  
The results of the ECB QE announcements are summarized in Table 5. Compared with other 
central banks, the ECB was a late-comer in implementing QE policy. This can be seen in the 
Table which shows only three QE announcements made before 2014. Out of all eight ECB 
                                                          
3 The results of days beyond the 3-day pre- and 3-day post-event window are available upon request.  
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events, three gave significant and anticipated results. The result for the 10th May 2010 
announcement is quite interesting, with abnormal returns positive and significant for both pre-
event and post-event days. These results suggest that the market anticipated that the ECB would 
come up with a buying strategy as Greece officially requested a bailout on the 23rd April 2010, 
together with its credit rating being downgraded to BB+ on 27th April that year.  
[Insert Table 5] 
The event-study results for the Bank of England (BOE) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) are 
presented in Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix. None of the eight QE announcements of the 
BOE produced any significant results on the announcement days or one day later. Two of the 
17 QE events of the BOJ gave significant results on the announcement day4, but the signs were 
different from expectations. Overall, the event-study analysis provides strong evidence on the 
impact of the Fed’s QE announcement on the gold price and weak evidence on the impact of 
the ECB, but evidently there is little impact of the BOE and BOJ announcements.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper tests the hypothesis that gold acts as an inflation, currency and stock market hedge, 
while providing a stock market safe haven for UK investors over the period 1985 to 2015, and 
for US investors over the period 2003 to 2015. We confirm that gold is a good inflation hedge 
investment instrument over the subsample period of 1985 to 1997 where both inflation and 
inflation expectations were high in the UK. However, gold did not provide an inflation hedge 
in the period of low inflation and inflation expectations in either the UK (1997-2015) or the 
US (2003-2015). Further, whereas gold acted as a safe haven asset and a good currency hedge 
                                                          
4 Because Japan time is nine hours ahead of the UK, the London PM Price should fully reflect Japanese QE 
news announced on the same day. Therefore, we focus on the results on day 0 for Japan and pay less attention to 
the results on the following day.  
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in all the periods studied for both the UK and US, it was not a stock market hedge across 
periods, except for the crisis period in the UK. Finally, the gold price moved significantly in 
response to the many QE announcements of the US Federal Reserve and several QE 
announcements of the European Central Bank, supporting the argument that QE affected asset 
prices through the portfolio rebalance channel. However, there is no evidence of an influence 
of QE announcements by the Bank of England or Bank of Japan on the gold price.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
   Mean (%) 
 Std. 
Dev. (%) 
 Maximum 
(%) 
 Minimum 
(%)  Skewness Kurtosis 
 No. of 
Observations 
UK data        
Gold 0.014 1.032 6.676 -9.624 -0.218 9.025 7628 
Effective 
exchange 
rate 
-0.002 0.428 3.062 -4.577 -0.455 8.154 7628 
Stock 
market 0.023 1.112 9.384 -13.029 -0.495 12.704 7628 
Inf Exp 10 -0.001 0.475 0.423 -0.513 -0.199 10.992 7628 
Inf Exp 5 -0.001 0.564 0.466 -0.690 -0.362 15.567 7628 
US data        
Gold 0.041 1.241 6.841 -9.596 -0.429 7.386 2972 
Effective 
exchange 
rate 
-0.002 0.327 1.736 -2.301 -0.023 6.966 2972 
Stock 
market 0.028 1.249 10.424 -9.470 -0.390 13.725 2972 
Inf Exp 10 -0.000 0.037 0.330 -0.360 -0.293 12.321 2972 
Inf Exp 5 -0.000 0.059 1.920 -0.410 11.566 390.222 2972 
 
Notes: Gold denotes the daily return of the gold price denominated in £ for the UK and $ for the US. Effective 
exchange rate denotes the daily rate of change of the trade-weighted exchange rate of the £ for the UK and the $ 
for the US. Stock market denotes the daily return of the FTSE 100 index for the UK and the S&P 500 index for 
the US. Inf Exp 10 and Inf Exp 5 denote the daily change in 10-year and 5-year inflation expectations, 
respectively, for both the UK and US. 
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Table 2 
Inflation hedge results 
Estimated Equations 
 𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 + +𝛽𝛽3𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚(1%),𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡)2 + 𝛾𝛾2ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
p = 10 p = 5 
UK  
03/01/1985
-
05/05/1997 
UK  
06/05/1997
-
19/03/2015 
US 
03/01/2003
-
19/03/2015 
UK  
03/01/1985
-
05/05/1997 
UK  
06/05/1997
-
19/03/2015 
US 
03/01/2003
-
19/03/2015 
Intercept  
-0.022 
(0.013)* 
0.015 
(0.012) 
0.035 
 (0.016)** 
-0.022 
(0.013) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
0.035 
(0.016)** 
Inflation 
Expectations 
0.916 
(0.197)*** 
-0.054 
(0.350) 
0.730 
(0.508) 
0.520 
(0.177)*** 
0.003 
(0.287) 
0.137 
(0.330) 
Exchange Rate 
-0.861 
(0.030)*** 
-0.689 
(0.027)*** 
-1.735 
(0.055)*** 
-0.877 
(0.029)*** 
-0.689 
(0.027)*** 
-1.742 
(0.055)*** 
Stock Market 
0.047 
(0.017)*** 
0.041 
(0.011)*** 
-0.066 
(0.016)*** 
-0.039 
(0.017)** 
0.041 
(0.011)*** 
-0.063 
(0.016)*** 
Extreme Stock 
Market Dummy 
-0.083 
(0.020)*** 
-0.118 
(0.019)*** 
-0.143 
(0.043)*** 
-0.076 
(0.020)*** 
-0.119 
(0.019)*** 
-0.137 
(0.044)*** 
GARCH Coef1 
0.008 
(0.002)*** 
0.024 
(0.002)*** 
0.019 
(0.003)*** 
0.008 
(0.002)*** 
0.024 
(0.002)*** 
0.019 
(0.003)*** 
GARCH Coef 2 
0.077 
(0.005)*** 
0.093 
(0.004)*** 
0.080  
(0.005)*** 
0.076 
(0.005)*** 
0.093 
(0.004)*** 
0.080 
(0.005)*** 
GARCH Coef3 
0.917 
(0.006)*** 
0.888 
(0.005)*** 
0.907 
(0.005)*** 
0.918 
(0.006)*** 
0.888 
(0.005)*** 
0.907 
(0.005)*** 
DW statistic 2.107 2.028 2.110 2.107 2.028 2.116 
𝑄𝑄(10) 8.389 7.473 15.753 8.230 7.471 15.490 
𝑄𝑄(10)2 7.605 8.691 3.700 7.613 8.673 3.753 
Adjusted R-squared 0.168 0.090 0.183 0.165 0.090 0.184 
t-test statistic (H0: 
Stock market + 
Extreme dummy = 0) 
-3.958*** -5.017*** -5.155*** -4.115*** -5.081*** -4.996*** 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. p = 10 and p = 
5 denote 10-year and 5-year inflation expectations, respectively. Q(10) and Q(10)2 are test statistics for 
autocorrelation. 
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Table 3 
Currency hedge, stock market hedge and safe haven results 
Estimated Equations 
 𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝜋𝜋10,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 + +𝛽𝛽3𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚(1%),𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡)2 + 𝛾𝛾2ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
 
UK  
03/01/1985
-
19/03/2015 
UK  
03/01/2003
-
19/03/2015 
US 
03/01/2003
-
19/03/2015 
UK  
07/08/2007
-
18/03/2009 
US  
07/08/2007
-
18/03/2009 
Intercept  
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.036 
(0.015)** 
0.034 
 (0.017)** 
0.099 
(0.070) 
0.090 
(0.075) 
Inflation 
Expectations 
0.783 
(0.153)*** 
-0.695 
(0.531) 
0.716 
(0.509) 
0.715 
(1.867) 
-0.624 
(1.881) 
Exchange Rate 
-0.769 
(0.020)*** 
-0.731 
(0.034)*** 
-1.735 
(0.055)*** 
-0.801 
(0.105)*** 
-2.237 
(0.220)*** 
Stock Market 
0.037 
(0.009)*** 
0.050 
(0.015)*** 
-0.068 
(0.019)*** 
-0.030 
(0.040) 
-0.140 
(0.049)*** 
Extreme Stock 
Market Dummy 
-0.093 
(0.012)*** 
-0.068 
(0.041)* 
-0.029 
(0.031) 
-0.032 
(0.070) 
0.035 
(0.080) 
GARCH Coef1 
0.017 
(0.001)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.019 
(0.003)*** 
0.015 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
GARCH Coef 2 
0.087 
(0.003)*** 
0.076 
(0.004)*** 
0.080  
(0.005)*** 
0.037 
(0.010)*** 
0.059 
(0.015)*** 
GARCH Coef3 
0.899 
(0.004)*** 
0.919 
(0.004)*** 
0.907 
(0.005)*** 
0.962 
(0.011)*** 
0.945 
(0.016)*** 
DW statistic 2.056 2.013 2.110 2.067 2.262 
𝑄𝑄(10) 5.498 10.783 14.995 5.488 16.297 
𝑄𝑄(10)2 9.674 4.640 3.554 9.043 14.040 
Adjusted R-squared 0.116 0.089 0.180 0.117 0.128 
t-test statistic (H0: 
Stock market + 
Extreme dummy = 0) 
-7.735*** -0.480 -4.079*** -1.004 -1.866* 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. Q(10) and 
Q(10)2 are test statistics for autocorrelation. 
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Table 4 
Federal Reserve QE announcements and gold abnormal returns  
Date Description 
  
day-
3 
day-
2 
day-
1 
day+0 day+1 day+2 day+3 
Nov 25 
2008 
  
FED will purchase $100 billion in 
GSE Debt and $500 billion in 
MBS 
+ AR -4.06 6.21 7.42 0.20 -0.05 0.52 0.56 
 
t-stat -1.40 2.13 
** 
2.54 
** 
0.07 -0.02 0.18 0.20 
Mar 18 
2009 
  
Fed will purchase $300 billion in 
Treasuries, additional $100 billion 
in GSE debt, and $750 billion in 
MBS 
+ AR 0.35 -0.98 -0.13 -2.27 6.68 -0.50 0.20 
 
t-stat 0.21 -0.57 -0.07 -1.31 3.89 
*** 
-0.29 0.11 
Nov 03 
2010 
  
Fed will purchase additional $600 
billion in Treasuries 
+ AR 0.84 0.42 -0.46 -0.58 2.33 0.87 -0.64 
 
t-stat 1.10 0.54 -0.60 -0.76 2.95 
*** 
1.13 -0.84 
Sep 21 
2011 
  
Fed will purchase additional $400 
billion in long-term Treasuries 
while selling equivalent in short-
term treasuries 
+ AR 0.49 -0.54 -0.07 -1.33 -5.10 -2.11 -5.32 
 
t-stat 0.30 -0.33 -0.04 -0.81 -3.09 
*** 
-1.30 -3.24 
*** 
Jun 20 
2012 
  
Fed extends purchase of long 
bonds/sales of short bonds 
+ AR 0.81 -0.67 0.59 -1.43 -0.88 -1.05 0.53 
 
t-stat 0.64 -0.53 0.46 -1.13 -0.67 -0.83 0.41 
Sep 13 
2012 
  
Fed will purchase $40 billion 
MBS/month 
+ AR 0.42 0.04 -0.18 -1.05 2.13 -0.26 -0.06 
 
t-stat 0.48 0.04 -0.20 -1.16 2.44 
** 
-0.30 -0.07 
Dec 12 
2012 
  
Fed will continue to purchase $45 
billion in long-term Treasuries per 
month but without the sale of 
short-term Treasuries to sterilize 
purchase 
+ AR 0.46 0.72 -0.16 0.44 -1.21 0.35 -0.13  
t-stat 0.58 0.90 -0.20 0.55 -1.50 0.43 -0.15 
May 
22 
2013 
  
Bernanke repeats to Congress the 
Fed is prepared to trim bonds 
buying if the economy improves 
sufficiently 
- AR -1.41 -0.67 0.61 4.42 -1.47 1.05 0.31  
t-stat -0.89 -0.42 0.39 2.77 
*** 
-0.93 0.67 0.19 
Jun 19 
2013 
  
Bernanke again hints that QE3 
could come to an end 
- AR 1.13 -0.59 -1.45 1.60 -4.18 0.38 0.40 
 
t-stat 0.63 -0.33 -0.81 0.87 -2.14 
** 
0.21 0.22 
Dec 18 
2013 
  
FOMC states that beginning 
January, it will begin tapering and 
reduce $10 billion off monthly 
bond purchases 
- AR 0.63 0.28 -0.16 -0.09 -2.77 0.00 0.37  
t-stat 0.53 0.23 -0.13 -0.07 -2.34 
** 
0.00 0.31 
Jun 18 
2014 
  
Fed announces that QE3 should be 
finalized by end of October 2014 
+ AR 0.72 0.30 -0.58 0.52 1.88 1.58 0.08  
t-stat 1.05 0.44 -0.86 0.76 2.75 
*** 
2.31 
** 
0.12 
Oct 29 
2014 
  
Fed votes to end bond-buying 
program and announces it will 
keep rates low 
- AR 0.20 -0.24 0.31 -0.39 -1.59 -2.93 0.40 
  t-stat 0.31 -0.39 0.47 -0.61 -2.49 
** 
-4.54 
*** 
0.63 
Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AR is the Abnormal Return expressed in %. The 
results of the event window from 3 days before to 3 days following the news announcement are presented in the 
table. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AR is zero is indicated by ***, ** and * for the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.    
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Table 5 
ECB QE announcements and gold abnormal returns  
Date Description 
  
day-
3 
day-
2 
day-
1 
day+0 day+1 day+2 day+3 
May 
07 
2009 
ECB will purchase €60 billion in 
covered bonds 
+ AR 0.21 2.97 0.17 0.35 -0.39 0.75 0.57 
 t-stat 0.11 1.60 0.09 0.19 -0.21 0.40 0.31 
May 
10 
2010 
ECB will purchase sovereign debt 
in secondary markets 
+ AR -1.67 2.25 1.62 -1.38 2.12 0.87 0.14 
 t-stat 
-2.14 
** 
2.43 
** 
2.00
* -1.39 
2.74 
*** 1.10 0.17 
Sep 06 
 2012 
ECB announces new program for 
buying sovereign debt 
+ AR 2.54 0.33 -0.41 -0.23 1.37 0.45 0.10 
 t-stat 
3.10 
*** 0.41 -0.50 -0.27 1.67* 0.55 0.13 
Aug 22 
2014 
Draghi warms that inflation 
expectations are weakening and 
hints of potential quantitative 
easing measures 
+ AR -0.11 -0.21 -1.63 0.06 -0.09 0.59 -0.35 
 t-stat -0.16 -0.29 -2.29 0.08 -0.13 0.83 -0.49 
Oct 20 
2014 
ECB begins 3rd Covered Bonds 
Purchase Program (CBPP3) 
+ AR 0.22 0.14 0.02 1.08 0.86 -0.51 -0.59 
 t-stat 0.33 0.21 0.03 1.61 1.22 -0.77 -0.88 
Nov 21 
2014 
ECB begins Asset Backed 
securities Purchase Program 
(ABSPP), with the intention of it 
lasting for two years 
+ AR 1.17 0.40 -0.28 1.46 -0.28 0.26 0.12 
 t-stat 1.49 0.51 -0.36 1.85* -0.35 0.34 0.15 
Jan 22 
2015 
ECB announces an expanded asset 
purchase program, where the Bank 
would purchase €60 billion euro 
per month from central 
governments, agencies and 
European institutions 
+ AR -0.45 1.05 0.31 0.31 -0.34 -1.15 0.15 
 t-stat -0.48 1.13 0.33 0.33 -0.36 -1.25 0.16 
Mar 10 
2015 
ECB begins Public Sector 
Purchase Program (PSPP) with 
90% of total purchases allocated to 
government bonds 
+ AR 0.20 -2.61 -0.56 -1.03 -1.12 0.47 -0.21 
  t-stat 0.21 
-
2.66
** -0.59 -1.04 -1.19 0.49 -0.22 
Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AR is the Abnormal Return expressed in %. The 
results of the event window from 3 days before to 3 days following the news announcement are presented in the 
table. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AR is zero is indicated by ***, ** and * for the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.    
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Currency hedge, stock market hedge and safe haven results (q = 5%) 
Estimated Equations  𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝜋𝜋10,𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 + +𝛽𝛽3𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚(1%),𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1(𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡)2 + 𝛾𝛾2ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
 
UK  
03/01/1985
-
19/03/2015 
UK  
03/01/2003
-
19/03/2015 
US 
03/01/2003
-
19/03/2015 
UK  
07/08/2007
-
18/03/2009 
US  
07/08/2007-18/03/2009 
Intercept  
-0.003 
(0.009) 
0.034 
(0.016)** 
0.0.035 
 (0.016)** 
0.086 
(0.077) 
0.065 
(0.067) 
Inflation Expectation 
0.729 
(0.151)*** 
-0.684 
(0.530) 
0.730 
(0.508) 
0.803 
(1.880) 
-0.42 
(1.745) 
Exchange Rate 
-0.771 
(0.020)*** 
-0.731 
(0.034)*** 
-1.735 
(0.055)*** 
-0.806 
(0.103)*** 
-2.306 
(0.223)*** 
Stock Market 
0.032 
(0.010)*** 
0.052 
(0.017)*** 
-0.066 
(0.016)*** 
-0.018 
(0.047) 
-0.093 
(0.037)** 
Extreme Stock 
Market Dummy 
-0.041 
(0.013)*** 
-0.032 
(0.029) 
-0.143 
(0.043)*** 
-0.047 
(0.074) 
-0.194 
(0.080)** 
GARCH Coef1 
0.017 
(0.001)*** 
0.011 
(0.002)*** 
0.019 
(0.003)*** 
0.015 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
GARCH Coef 2 
0.087 
(0.003)*** 
0.075 
(0.004)*** 
0.080  
(0.005)*** 
0.038 
(0.010)*** 
0.067 
(0.016)*** 
GARCH Coef3 
0.899 
(0.004)*** 
0.919 
(0.004)*** 
0.907 
(0.005)*** 
0.961 
(0.012)*** 
0.936 
(0.017)*** 
DW statistic 2.059 2.018 2.110 2.073 2.316 
𝑄𝑄(10) 4.869 10.108 15.753 5.189 17.069 
𝑄𝑄(10)2 9.352 4.661 3.700 9.203 15.708 
Adjusted R-squared 0.115 0.086 0.183 0.119 0.121 
t-test statistic (H0: 
Stock market + 
Extreme dummy = 0) 
-1.221 0.847 -5.155*** -1.177 -3.994*** 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. Q(10) and 
Q(10)2 are test statistics for autocorrelation. 
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Table A2 
Bank of England QE announcements and gold abnormal returns  
Date Description 
  
day-3 day-
2 
day-
1 
day+0 day+1 day+2 day+3 
Jan 19 2009 BOE will purchase 
up to £50 billion in 
private assets 
+ AR -0.48 -1.74 2.47 -0.41 2.79 -1.34 1.14  
t-stat -0.21 -0.76 1.08 -0.18 1.19 -0.58 0.50 
Mar 05 2009 BOE announces £75 
billion QE program 
+ AR -2.36 -2.81 -0.47 -0.25 2.31 -1.64 -1.84  
t-stat -1.42 -1.76 -0.29 -0.15 1.44 -1.02 -1.06 
May 07 2009 BOE expands QE 
program to £125 
billion 
+ AR 0.21 2.97 0.17 0.35 -0.39 0.75 0.57  
t-stat 0.11 1.60 0.09 0.19 -0.21 0.40 0.31 
Aug 06 2009 BOE expands QE 
program to £175 
billion 
+ AR 1.92 0.07 0.11 0.53 -1.06 -1.04 0.07  
t-stat 2.07** 0.07 0.12 0.57 -1.14 -1.13 0.08 
Nov 05 2009 BOE expands QE 
program to £200 
billion 
+ AR 1.77 -0.31 2.51 -0.75 0.49 0.17 -0.63  
t-stat 1.85* -0.33 2.64 -0.77 0.51 0.17 -0.66 
Oct 06 2011 BOE expands QE 
program to £275 
billion 
+ AR 1.57 -0.63 -0.95 1.46 0.86 1.20 0.12 
 
t-stat 0.76 -0.31 -0.46 0.71 0.42 0.58 0.06 
Feb 09 2012  
BOE expands QE 
program to £325 
billion 
+ AR -0.79 0.25 1.22 0.10 -1.72 0.22 0.22 
 
t-stat -0.54 0.17 0.84 0.07 -1.17 0.15 0.15 
Jul 05 2012 BOE expands QE 
program to £375 
billion  
+ AR -0.36 1.60 -0.17 -0.46 -0.88 -0.03 0.81  
t-stat -0.30 1.33 -0.14 -0.38 -0.73 -0.02 0.68 
Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AR is the Abnormal Return expressed 
in %. The results of the event window from 3 days before to 3 days following the news announcement are 
presented in the table. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AR is zero is indicated 
by ***, ** and * for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.    
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Table A3 
Bank of Japan QE announcements and gold abnormal returns  
Date Description 
 
day-3 day-2 day-1 day+0 day+1 day+2 day+3 
Dec 19 
2008 
BOJ increases 
monthly JGB 
purchases to 
1.4 
trillion/month 
AR 1.77 3.76 -1.72 -2.21 1.57 -0.61 0.10 
t-stat 0.57 1.24 -0.57 -0.73 0.52 -0.20 0.03 
Jan 22 
2009 
BOJ will 
purchase up to 
3 trillion in 
commercial 
paper 
AR -0.30 3.03 -1.34 1.28 1.52 3.57 -1.79 
t-stat -0.13 1.30 -0.57 0.56 0.67 1.56 -0.78 
Feb 19 
2009 
BOJ will 
purchase up to 
1 trillion in 
corporate 
bonds  
AR 0.35 1.85 -0.82 1.19 0.36 -1.04 -0.20 
t-stat 0.19 0.95 -0.44 0.63 0.19 -0.54 -0.10 
Mar 18 
2009 
BOJ increases 
monthly JGB 
purchases to 
1.8 
trillion/month 
AR 0.35 -0.98 -0.13 -2.27 6.68 -0.50 0.20 
t-stat 0.21 -0.57 -0.07 -1.31 3.89*** -0.29 0.11 
Oct 05 
2010 
BOJ will 
purchase 5 
trillion in 
public and 
private assets 
AR -0.24 0.53 -0.43 1.18 1.00 -0.31 -0.43 
t-stat -0.33 0.73 -0.59 1.57 1.37 -0.43 -0.59 
Mar 14 
2011 
BOJ will 
purchase 
additional 5 
trillion in 
public and 
private assets 
AR 0.26 -1.33 -0.20 0.68 -1.62 0.03 0.05 
t-stat 0.29 -1.41 -0.23 0.77 -1.80* 0.03 0.06 
Aug 04 
2011 
BOJ will 
purchase 
additional 5 
trillion in 
public and 
private assets  
AR -0.56 0.34 1.83 -0.32 -1.41 0.79 3.09 
t-stat -0.76 0.43 2.49 -0.36 -1.92 0.76 3.46 
Oct 27 
2011 
BOJ will 
purchase 
additional ¥5 
trillion in JGBs 
AR 1.02 -0.20 3.88 1.18 1.44 -1.67 -2.00 
t-stat 0.50 -0.10 1.90 0.56 0.70 -0.80 -0.96 
Feb 14 
2012 
BOJ will 
purchase 
additional 10 
trillion in JGBs 
AR 0.15 -1.70 0.29 0.26 0.98 -1.55 0.58 
t-stat 0.10 -1.14 0.20 0.18 0.66 -1.04 0.39 
Apr 27 
2012 
BOJ will 
purchase 
additional 10 
trillion in 
JGBs/reduce 
FROs 
AR 1.25 -1.05 0.86 0.65 -0.48 0.70 -0.75 
t-stat 1.15 -0.94 0.79 0.60 -0.44 0.65 -0.69 
Jul 12 
2012 
BOJ will 
purchase 
additional 5 
trillion in 
Treasury 
AR -0.06 0.88 -1.13 -1.17 2.09 -0.28 -0.45 
t-stat -0.05 0.71 -0.91 -0.95 1.65* -0.23 -0.36 
37 
 
bills/reduce 
FROs 
Sep 19 
2012 
BOJ will 
purchase 
additional 10 
trillion in 
Treasury bills 
and JGBs 
AR 2.18 -0.34 -0.11 -0.31 -0.57 1.35 -1.29 
t-stat 2.61** -0.40 -0.13 -0.37 -0.69 1.63 -1.55 
Oct 30 
2012 
BOJ will 
purchase 
additional 
public debt and 
1 trillion 
private assets  
AR 0.36 -0.08 -0.64 0.06 0.40 -0.45 -1.80 
t-stat 0.40 -0.09 -0.72 0.06 0.45 -0.49 -1.97** 
Dec 20 
2012 
BOJ will 
purchase 
additional 10 
trillion in 
Treasury bills 
and JGBs 
AR -0.08 -0.15 -1.59 -0.86 0.22 0.09 0.06 
t-stat -0.11 -0.20 -2.09** -1.14 0.29 0.12 0.09 
Jan 22 
2013 
BOJ sets a 
price stability 
target of 2% 
and announces 
it will 
introduce the 
open-ended 
asset 
purchasing 
method under 
the APP 
AR -0.13 0.78 -0.03 0.14 -0.01 -1.11 -0.71 
t-stat -0.15 0.94 -0.03 0.17 -0.01 -1.34 -0.85 
Apr 04 
2013 
BOJ introduce 
the QQE 
monetary 
easing 
program, 
announcing it 
will double the 
monetary base 
and continue to 
conduct money 
market 
operations 
increasing the 
monetary base 
60-70 trillion 
annually 
AR 0.16 -0.89 -0.31 -1.76 1.54 0.47 0.20 
t-stat 0.28 -1.49 -0.50 -2.95*** 2.58** 0.78 0.34 
Oct 31 
2014 
BOJ expands 
QQE program 
and accelerates 
JGB purchases 
to 80 trillion 
(up by 30 
trillion) 
annually 
AR 0.35 -0.36 -1.55 -2.89 0.43 -0.02 -1.91 
t-stat 0.53 -0.56 -2.41 -4.42*** 0.66 -0.03 -2.96 
Notes: This table presents the price reaction to each announcement. AR is the Abnormal Return expressed 
in %. The results of the event window from 3 days before to 3 days following the news announcement are 
presented in the table. The significance of the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that AR is zero is indicated 
by ***, ** and * for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.    
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Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Bank of England 
(BOE) (2017) 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Figure 1: UK annual inflation and inflation 
expectations
UK annual CPI inflation UK Implied 10-year inflation expectation
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Figure 2: US annual inflation and inflation 
expectations
US annual CPI inflation US implied 10-year inflation expectation
